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Backing up into advocacy: The case of 
smartphone driver distraction 
 
Robert Rosenberger 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
For the last decade, I’ve been studying the topic of the driving impairment of 
smartphones. While this began as an exclusively academic project, it has 
increasingly compelled public engagement. One example of this came in an 
opinion piece I wrote in 2018 in response to a new traffic law. I take the opportunity 
here to fill out the academic backstory of this particular op-ed, reflect on how this 
larger project has evolved to include an unanticipated public-facing edge, and 
abstract some lessons about public writing.  
 





In the summer of 2018, the Hands-Free Georgia Act went into effect. 
Where the U.S. state of Georgia had previously outlawed only handheld 
texting while driving, now all handheld smartphone usage behind the 
wheel would be illegal. This was a response to an urgent threat. After 
decades of decline, the US was suddenly experiencing a sharp spike in 
roadway fatalities (Rosenberger, 2017c). Georgia saw one of the largest 
increases in the country. Driver distraction appeared to be a likely factor. I 
had been writing about the topic of smartphones and distracted driving for 
a decade, so it felt like a duty to comment publicly on the new policy. 
Since I’m based in Atlanta, I did interviews for the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution and the city’s NPR radio station, and spoke at an event at 
City Hall. And I wrote an op-ed for the Saporta Report, an Atlanta-based 
online news site (Rosenberger, 2018). I had a two-part message: (1) the 
Hands-Free Georgia Act is an important step forward; but also (2) it does 
not go far enough. Drivers should not only refrain from using a handheld 
smartphone. They should stop using hands-free phones too, including 
hands-free phone conversation, texting, and other voice-to-text and text-
to-audio communication functions enabled by smartphone apps and 
dashboard infotainment systems. 
 
I would like to take the opportunity of a public scholarship report to issue a 
kind of postscript to the Saporta Report piece, and to put it into the context 
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of the evolution of its larger research project. When I began this line of 
study, I didn’t have public outreach in mind, nor did I have much 
experience with that kind of work. But this philosophical project has 
increasingly compelled public engagement. 
 
I work from the phenomenological perspective, a tradition of thought that 
begins its inquiries from the deep description of human experience. This 
philosophical approach specializes in drawing out our bodily interactions 
with the world, the roles of habituation, and the structures of perception. 
And I work in the field of philosophy of technology. So, my research often 
involves the attempt to describe the experience of technology usage. 
When I started this project on distracted driving, I was thinking about the 
user experience of two of the most commonplace technologies of 
contemporary life: the smartphone and the car. My suspicion was that a 
phenomenological account might be able to bring some distinctive insights 
to the issue of the driver distraction of smartphones.  
 
Before I began, I assumed that this project would involve three main tasks: 
(1) gathering up and analyzing work in phenomenology on the experience 
of using the phone, (2) looking into the empirical research on smartphone 
driver distraction to see what theories have already been developed there, 
and (3) applying the phenomenological insights to that discussion, 
perhaps by developing another theory, or perhaps by commenting on the 
existing theories. But I immediately encountered two surprises. They both 
presented challenges and opportunities. 
 
Surprise #1: Prior phenomenological work was thin 
I didn’t find much on telephone usage in the phenomenological literature.1 
So, a first part of this line of research has been to develop my own 
account of the experience of using the phone. I turned to my home-base 
theoretical perspective, “postphenomenology,” which builds on Don Ihde’s 
corpus of work to develop practical tools for describing human-technology 
relations.2 Postphenomenology pulls together ideas from the 
phenomenological canon, American pragmatism, and Science & 
Technology Studies to offer a framework of concepts for drawing out and 
articulating our experiences with technology. But I found even this 
perspective to require amendments in order to capture the aspects of the 
experience of phone usage that I was after.  
 
1 There have been some exceptions, of course. A few of the phenomenological studies of 
phone usage that have been helpful to my thinking include (Backhaus, 1997; Richardson, 
2007; Wellner, 2016).  
2 For some introductory works on postphenomenology, see: Ihde, 2009; Rosenberger & 
Verbeek, 2015; Aagaard, 2016. 
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For example, the postphenomenological framework, building directly on 
the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is useful for 
describing the ways in which aspects of a technology may withdraw into 
the background of our awareness as we become focused more on what 
we are using the device to do. In Ihde’s terminology, one main way that 
this kind of experience occurs is in terms of technological “embodiment.” 
That is, in this form of human-technology relation, the user’s bodily 
awareness is extended through the device (e.g., 2009, p. 42). For 
example, if someone “knows how to drive,” then they do not only possess 
information in their brain about which aspects of the car’s interface (the 
steering wheel, the pedals, etc.) do what, they have been trained to drive 
the car. And they have come to embody the car’s interface with what Ihde 
calls a high degree of “transparency” (e.g., 2009, p. 42). The driver pays 
active attention to the road. As they do this, the steering wheel and pedals 
often instead become somewhat transparent, withdrawing into the 
background of what is present to that driver. Good driving calls for a 
transparently embodied relationship with many aspects of the car. You’ve 
got to be more explicitly aware of the road ahead than the steering wheel 
in your hands. 
 
Phone usage can be similar. When one is engrossed in phone 
conversation, the phone itself is embodied and can at times take on a 
considerable degree of transparency. The phone in-hand can withdraw 
into the background of awareness even as it makes possible that 
conversation with a far-away interlocutor. 
 
However, the transparency of the phone itself is not the most important 
aspect of the phenomenology of phone usage. We need to find a way to 
describe what it means to be “on the phone,” to have our experience 
captured by it, to be engrossed in its usage, to have an immersive phone-
mediated interaction with another person. To do this, I have developed 
some conceptual expansions of the postphenomenological framework. I 
suggest that alongside a notion like “transparency,” we should also 
consider other ways that some human-technology relations may more 
radically reorganize our overall awareness.3 If, for example, I’m absorbed 
in a book, we might describe much of my “field of awareness” to be 
occupied or taken up by the content of what I’m reading. We can think of a 
 
3 Classical phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch provides some broad inspiration here, with 
his language of the “organization” of the “field of consciousness” (1964). For an 
introduction to my framework of concepts around the field of awareness see 
Rosenberger, 2017b, and for their application to the topic of e-reading, see Rosenberger, 
2017a. 
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person’s technologically-mediated field of awareness as the totality of 
things they are aware of within a given moment, in part shaped by their 
relationships with technology. A driver, for example, maintains a complex, 
shifting, and yet highly specific field of awareness that includes the 
roadway ahead, a whole-body sensation of the car on the road, the audio 
perception of relevant traffic sounds, and shifting levels of engagement 
with things like dashboard readouts and the content of mirrors.  
 
I suggest too that for someone that has a long-developed relationship with 
a device, these aspects of experiential organization (e.g., what becomes 
transparent, what is explicitly present, and how their entire field of 
awareness is composed) may become associated with bodily-perceptual 
habits. Pulling from the history of phenomenology, we can refer to this as 
“sedimentation.” A relationship to a particular device might be more or less 
sedimented, more or less automatic, immediate, and stubborn. For 
example, we can imagine how difficult it would be for an experienced 
driver if we were to suddenly switch around the interface of their usual car, 
say, by swapping the locations of the gas and brake pedals. Sure, this 
driver would eventually adjust to the new configuration. But there would be 
some difficulty. Importantly, not only would this person need to learn the 
new functions of the old pedals, they would additionally need to unlearn 
the previous pedal arrangement. They’d need to retrain themselves to 
resist the urge to stomp the old brake pedal when it is time to stop. The 
difficulty this person would face in resisting that urge is a reflection of the 
depth of the sedimentation of their relationship to the car. These notions of 
sedimentation and the field of awareness have found use in a variety of 
other research projects, including studies on video chat, classroom 
distraction, e-reading, online values, facial prostheses, dance training, and 
virtual reality (e.g., Spicer, 2014; Aagaard, 2015; Rosenberger, 2017a; 
Susser, 2017; Yaron et al., 2017; Kapasali, 2019; Kerruish, 2019). 
 
My suggestion is that we should think about our relations to the phone in 
these terms. When someone is immersed in phone usage—e.g., absorbed 
in conversation over the phone—it is not merely the case that the phone in 
hand may become experientially transparent. We could also say that the 
phone conversation steps forward and even comes to compose much of 
our field of awareness. The practical entirety of that which the phone user 
is aware in a given moment may be overtaken by the experience of the 
content of the conversation and the presence of their interlocutor. It is 
possible to imagine someone in a normal and uneventful situation—say, 
standing alone in a familiar room—that becomes immersed in phone 
conversation such that they experience a greatly diminished situational 
awareness, barely noticing their immediate surroundings. I contend that 
4
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for the average smartphone user today, for whom the device is a normal 
and always present companion, these structures of immersive awareness 
are highly sedimented.  
 
Surprise #2: Prior empirical work was theoretically 
underdeveloped 
There was not already a bustling theoretical discussion within the 
empirical research. These scientists were hard at work proving that things 
like texting and talking on the phone are very dangerous to do while 
driving. Texting was turning out to present by far the biggest hazard (e.g., 
Drews et al., 2009; Yager, 2012; and for a meta-analysis of studies, see: 
Caird et al., 2014). But talking on the phone too has been shown to be 
associated with a significant drop in driving performance, and this goes 
equally for using a handheld and hands-free phone conversation (for a few 
examples of literature reviews and meta-analyses of this voluminous body 
of research, see: McCartt et al., 2006; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Lipovak et 
al., 2017; Caird et al., 2018).4 In addition to the simulator and test-track 
data that reveal associations between driving mistakes and phone usage, 
the epidemiological research (i.e., studies that contrast phone records with 
other data such as hospital and police reports) show phone conversation 
to increase the danger of driving by three to four times (e.g., Redelmeier & 
Tibshirani, 1997; McEvoy et al., 2005; Elvik, 2011). Phone usage even 
bears comparison to drunk driving (e.g., Strayer et al., 2006; Leung et al., 
2012). Studies are beginning to also show that hands-free text 
communication, such as texting or emailing through voice-to-text 
smartphone apps, can be even more dangerous than handheld texting, 
especially when the programs are prone to error (e.g., Yager, 2013; 
Strayer et al., 2014). 
 
Although this has changed somewhat since I first began studying this 
topic, the empirical discussion on smartphones and distracted driving is 
flush with data but comparatively thin on theory, an exciting situation for a 
theorist like me. However, while only a minority of the papers in this 
discussion are doing explicit theory work, there does appear to be an 
implicit account reflected in the ways in which some of them report their 
findings. The data are largely behavioral (e.g., observed stopping 
distances). Yet, concluding sections of these articles sometimes report on 
the observation of a lack of “cognitive resources,” or “information 
processing power,” or “attention” required to safely perform the two tasks 
of driving and using the phone at the same time. As a phenomenologist, 
 
4 One important line of research that provides some disconfirmatory evidence is the in-
cab camera naturalistic studies (e.g., Dingus et al., 2016). 
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this kind of language jumps off the page at me since it reflects a different 
basic understanding of the mind from my own theoretical outlook. It does 
not scan to me as an innocent or obvious description of the data. It reads 
as an implicit theoretical account. 
 
Truth be told, I think my main contribution to the empirical research is 
actually the basic observation that this discussion maintains a default 
theory, namely the theory that the driving impairment of smartphones is 
ultimately due to our inherently limited cognitive resources. According to 
this view, we simply cannot multitask well enough to safely drive and talk 
on the phone at once. Such a theory helps to address why not only 
handheld, but also hands-free phones, result in driving performance 
decrements. When a driver talks on a hands-free phone, they can keep 
eyes forward and hands on the wheel, so the resulting danger cannot 
stem simply from the act of looking away from the road. According to this 
account, hands-free phone usage causes impaired driving because of its 
mental taxation. My suggestion is that the more specific theories offered 
within this literature—such as the idea of a “resource bottleneck,” or that 
drivers experience “inattention blindness”—are subspecies of this larger 
cognitive resources account. 
 
But to really show that this cognitive account is a theory, and not merely a 
description of the world as it is, I would need to develop an alternative 
theory of these same data. To do so, I appealed to a 
postphenomenological conception of sedimentation and technology’s 
capacity to reorganize a user’s field of awareness. It is essential to note 
that I do not disagree with these scientists about the results that show 
people to be very bad at driving while using the phone. And, I agree with 
those empirical researchers who conclude that smartphone driving 
impairment is a pressing public problem that must be addressed. My 
disagreement is over exactly how it is that smartphone usage results in 
poorer driving performance. The tricky part in developing an alternative 
theory would be the attempt to describe this phenomenon without any 
reference to cognitive processes, resource quantities, metaphors to 
computing, or any kind of mechanistic conception of the human mind. As 
explanatory actors go, it would be best if I could leave the brain out of it 
entirely.  
 
The alternative account of the data on smartphone driving impairment I’ve 
proposed, including the distraction of hands-free phones, goes like this: 
when immersed in phone usage, the driver’s field of awareness can 
become largely composed by the content of that phone relation, and they 
can fail to perceive their immediate surroundings. This relation to the 
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phone is often associated with considerable sedimentation, so the driver 
may at times be pulled into an organization of awareness focused upon 
the world opened up by the phone. Put more plainly, due to long-
developed habits, a driver may be inclined at times to become occupied 
more by the conversation taking place over the phone than on the road 
ahead. A driver may even attempt to maintain active concentration on both 
the phone conversation and the driving, and this may work for a time. But, 
perhaps when the driving becomes dull or the conversation becomes 
engaging, those habits of perception may come creeping in and pull the 
driver’s attention away from the road and into a field of awareness 
organized mostly around the person on the other end of the line. 
 
After initially proposing my account of the phenomenology of smartphone 
conversation and its application to the distracted driving research 
(Rosenberger, 2010, 2012), I applied these ideas to a variety of subtopics 
within this discussion. These include the issue of passenger distraction 
(which is not always as dangerous as the phone, Rosenberger, 2019), 
dashboard infotainment systems and hands-free texting (Rosenberger, 
2013a, 2013b, 2015), wearable computing (Rosenberger, 2104b, 2015), 
and the implications of automated vehicles (Rosenberger, forthcoming).5  
 
Backing up into advocacy 
In this way, the project has been a somewhat typical line of academic 
research, albeit an interdisciplinary one, and one with at least two potential 
audiences. The first is those who may be interested in the science of 
distracted driving. The second is the postphenomenological researchers 
who may be interested in the new conceptual tools (e.g., the “field of 
awareness,” “sedimentation” as a factor in technology usage) coming out 
of the exploration of this case. 
 
However, I soon came to realize that there was another, more important 
audience that I should be attempting to reach. This project was essentially 
an attempt to describe driver distraction in new ways. As such, my work 
could have some utility in communicating this problem to the public. 
Perhaps the theoretical account I am developing could inform the 
language used in persuading people that these dangers are real. I should 
be trying to leverage my place as a professional researcher on this topic to 
create ways to get the word out.  
 
 
5 For a philosophical debate over these issues, see the 18(2-3), 2014 special issue of the 
journal Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology.  
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I’ve been doing this public-facing work so far mainly through participation 
in media coverage of this topic, and through writing op-eds in for-the-
public venues. For example, I’ve published a series of pieces in Slate 
magazine online, covering topics such as the tragic repeal of the first 
citywide ban of handheld electronics while driving in the US, and recent 
industry lobbying for less restrictive government dashboard infotainment 
system design recommendations (e.g., Rosenberger, 2014a, 2017c). The 
media relations department at the university where I work has been helpful 
in the development of a press release and other forms of press contact 
that have informed reporters about my academic work. This has provided 
opportunities to synopsize my views for the public in print and on the 
radio. And when a separate project of mine went viral—a related study 
about “phantom vibration syndrome” (that thing when you feel your phone 
vibrate in your pocket although it didn’t actually vibrate)—I did my best to 
turn that virality into opportunities to spread the word about the dangers of 
smartphone driver distraction. 
 
I’ve learned through these experiences that justifications for media 
participation come in at least two varieties. The first is the straightforward 
sharing of exactly the findings of your own research. Insofar as your own 
work may be newsworthy, you may find the opportunity to garner media 
attention, or write about it in public venues. However, if new to writing for 
the general public, as I largely was when I began this project a decade 
ago, then there can be some surprising challenges. The kinds of content 
you can write, and the kinds of styles you can take up, for media venues 
are very different from academic publishing, even when it is exactly your 
own research you are writing about. As others have said before, the work 
of communicating with a public audience calls for its own skillset. (Of 
course media participation and op-ed writing is not the only form of public-
facing philosophical work. Nor is it necessarily the best or most effective 
kind. It is simply what I have been able to do so far. Other forms will 
similarly call for the development of skills that academics do not 
automatically already possess.6)   
 
The second is participation in public discussion based on your general 
status as an expert on the topic. Media outlets are often open to allowing 
 
6 Under a variety of names, there have been various, if often halting, calls over the years 
for “engaged,” “activist,” “public,” and “field” philosophy and STS (e.g., Durbin, 2000; 
Woodhouse et al., 2002; Bijker, 2003; Douglas, 2010; Wittkower et al., 2013; Brister & 
Frodeman, 2020; Fried, forthcoming). And there are many philosophers and STS 
practitioners that are simply already waist deep in the practice of doing public philosophy, 
often in their own individual ways, sometimes as a part of engaged or activist 
communities. I take my reflections here to be broadly consistent with themes emerging 
across this kind of work. 
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you to opine about the general aspects of a topic based on your status as 
someone who has published something—anything—academic on some 
specific aspect of that topic. So, for example, my piece in the Saporta 
Report last year has a flash or two of the postphenomenological 
perspective on smartphone driving impairment I’ve developed. But it is 
mainly a rundown on my general, albeit informed, opinions on the topic. 
My license to drop those opinions—i.e., my status as a recognized 
expert—comes from my documented participation in the academic work, 
as well as my university position. I’ve parlayed my highly restricted 
philosophical theorizing about driver distraction into the authorization to 
write in media outlets about this topic in a way that is widely ranging, 
punchy, and which draws on the cognitive language whenever useful.   
 
There are several reasons why the issue of smartphone driver distraction 
in particular is something that deserves activist engagement with the 
public. Since the scientific findings show this behavior to be both 
dangerous and pervasive, it is of course straightforwardly important to get 
the word out about these dangers. However, the problem of smartphone 
driver distraction calls for more than merely raising awareness. 
Addressing this problem calls for more than merely the task of making 
information available. An appeal to the public must be made. We must get 
through to people. I see at least three reasons for this charge. And in the 




For one, it is possible that developing a variety of languages for 
communicating the dangers of driver distraction will be helpful for creating 
messages that resonate with more people. Beyond the data themselves, 
the notion of “cognitive distraction” has been one of the most important 
things to come out of the empirical research. The idea is that handheld 
texting and phone usage involves both the “manual distraction” of failing to 
hold the steering wheel with both hands, and the “visual distraction” of 
taking your eyeballs off the road. Although hands-free smartphone usage 
doesn’t involve either of those forms of distraction, it is still dangerously 
distracting. This is because, like handheld phone conversation too, hands-
free phone usage results in cognitive distraction. It’s a powerful and 
relatively simple argument. And over the last decade and a half, the 
language of cognitive distraction has found its way into the literature of 
organizations such as the National Safety Council, the American 
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However, it appears that not all drivers are convinced by this line of 
reasoning. Additional concepts and arguments may be helpful. Emotional 
appeals are sometimes made, providing the awful details of cases of 
distracted driving deaths. A language of addiction is also sometimes taken 
up in consciousness raising efforts. The idea is that if you’re addicted to 
using your phone, then you cannot trust yourself to use it responsibly, and 
you should just put it away entirely when driving. 
 
In addition to all these, the postphenomenological account I’ve been 
developing may offer some of its own distinct advantages in 
communicating these dangers. From the phenomenology, we can abstract 
a language of habituation. The pull of smartphone communication into 
distraction is one that comes with the force of a “bad habit.” It is possible 
that some drivers are resistant to activist efforts that rely on cognitive or 
addiction vocabularies because they do not see any evidence that they 
themselves are experiencing a cognitive deficit or an addictive 
dependence. This is exactly where bad habit metaphors may be effective. 
Habits often function surreptitiously, enacting influence in a way that can 
be difficult to notice. And overturning bad habits requires not only 
confidence in your own will power, but active effort put toward unlearning 
them. Even if you are sure that you are neither cognitively impaired by 
your phone, nor addicted to it, you may be open to the possibility that 
you’ve developed some bad habits. Perhaps these ideas will be 
persuasive to some drivers.   
 
Countering bias 
Second, here’s what I believe to be the most important set of empirical 
findings on smartphones and distracted driving: people are extremely poor 
judges of their own level of smartphone-induced driving impairment. 
Drivers cannot be counted on to make reliable assessments of how 
distracted they are by the phone (e.g., Horrey et al., 2008; Sanmonbatsu 
et al., 2016; Terry & Terry, 2016). There’s some indication that many 
drivers even recognize smartphone distraction to be a serious danger, and 
yet at the same time each see themselves to be a specific exception to 
that pattern. This is why efforts to educate the public must go beyond 
simple communication of the dangers. A variety of communication and 
argument strategies may be necessary since some drivers—including 
some of the most confident ones—are specifically underestimating their 








There’s a third reason that efforts to convince the public about the dangers 
of using a smartphone while driving must go beyond mere education: the 
public is constantly receiving messaging to the contrary. It is in the 
economic interest of several business sectors, including the automotive 
industry and the telecommunications industry, that drivers not refrain too 
much from using smartphones while behind the wheel. Quite a lot of 
investment has been put into hands-free smartphone applications and 
personal assistant programming, as well as dashboard infotainment 
systems that pair with your phone. There’s been a marketing push for 
these “connectivity features.” When it comes to hands-free smartphone 
applications—including texting, calling, email, social media, apps, and 
dashboard functionality—there is money on the line. Drivers are potential 
customers. In the attention economy, drivers are an important market. 
Representatives from these industries actively lobby government officials 
to limit legal restrictions. It is true that some in these industries actively 
discourage drivers from engaging in handheld texting while driving, and 
this is important. Yet, these efforts can also be interpreted to exclusively 
attack the very most distracting activity while at the same time actively 
promoting other distracting behaviors.  
 
Also, consider the laws like the handheld statewide texting bans that have 
proliferated across the US, as well as handheld smartphone bans like the 
Hands-Free Georgia Act that are beginning to appear. By outlawing only 
handheld phone usage, and specifically failing to restrict hands-free 
usage, drivers are sent the message that hands-free smartphone usage 
should be encouraged. The public-facing work of scientists and other 
activists against distracted driving cannot be understood to be merely an 
effort to provide an important message; it must be understood as a form of 
counter-messaging. 
 
Ultimately, I hope we can abstract some useful things from my experience 
of slowly and awkwardly backing into public engagement on the issue of 
distracted driving. I certainly have learned much myself. I now approach 
my ongoing work on other topics differently. Of course, much of what I do, 
such as developing postphenomenological theory, still falls mainly in the 
category of traditional academic research. But as I engage in each new 
research effort, I am now on the lookout for how any project might have 
public applications. For example, when my current work on homelessness 
and the politics of public space came to take on a publicly relevant 
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Public discussion on urgent and important topics requires experts not only 
to raise awareness of their research findings. They may need to do more 
than merely comment or weigh in. They may need to philosophize. That is, 
they may need to bring philosophy to bear on public discussions to urge 
people to think about topics in different ways, through different arguments, 
different conceptual frameworks, and different language.  
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